The welfare gains from international coordination of monetary policy are analysed in a two-country model with sticky prices. The gains from coordination are compared under two alternative structures for …nancial markets: …nancial autarky and risk sharing. The welfare gains from coordination are found to be largest when there is risk sharing and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is greater than unity. When there is no risk sharing the gains to coordination are almost zero. It is also shown that the welfare gain from risk sharing can be negative when monetary policy is uncoordinated. The assumption that …nancial markets do not exist is to some extent less extreme than it may seem at …rst. When the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is unity the trade balance is always close to balance in any case. The structure of international …nancial markets is therefore largely irrelevant.
Non-technical summary
But the model used by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) is special in two respects which are likely to have important implications for the welfare gains from policy coordination. Firstly, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is restricted to unity. This elasticity determines the extent to which exchange rate changes cause changes in demand for goods from di¤erent countries. It is therefore an important determinant of the spillover e¤ect of monetary policy from one country to another. Secondly, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ assume that international …nancial markets do not exist. The trade balance is therefore forced into exact balance in all states of the world. Again this removes a potential source of international spillover e¤ects of monetary policy.
The assumption that …nancial markets do not exist is to some extent less extreme than it may seem at …rst. When the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is unity the trade balance is always close to balance in any case. The structure of international …nancial markets is therefore largely irrelevant.
The structure of …nancial markets does however become much more important when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods di¤ers from unity. In this case large trade imbalances are possible so the structure of …nancial markets will have an important in ‡uence on the behaviour of the exchange rate and the consequential spillover e¤ects of monetary policy. Benigno and Benigno (2001a) analyse a model similar to the Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) model which allows for a non-unit elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods and which assumes a …nancial structure which permits full international consumption risk sharing. They show that the gains from coordination depend on the degree of elasticity of substitution, but in general Benigno and Benigno are not able to solve explicitly for welfare or quantify the gains from coordination.
A constraint that has hitherto hampered progress on this issue is the fact that it is not possible to obtain an explicit exact solution for welfare when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods di¤ers from unity. This paper adopts an approximation technique to overcome this problem. Second-order accurate solutions for welfare are obtained for the general case where the elasticity of substitution di¤ers from unity. This allows explicit solutions for the coordinated and non-coordinated policy rules to be obtained and explicit expressions for the welfare yielded by coordinated and non-coordinated policy to be derived. It is therefore possible to trace the spillover e¤ects which give rise to gains from policy coordination and it is possible to quantify these gains.
The model is used to investigate the implications of the elasticity of substitution for the gains from policy coordination. The implications of …nancial market structure are also analysed. The gains from coordination that arise when there is no …nancial market are compared to the gains that arise when there is international risk sharing.
In the case where there is no …nancial market it is found that a non-unit elasticity of substitution can indeed give rise to gains from coordination. But, as in the cases analysed by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) , these gains are quantitatively very small.
But in the risk-sharing case it is found that the gains from coordination can be much higher. The existence of …nancial markets creates additional spillover e¤ects which greatly increase the gains from policy coordination. Quantitatively these gains can be quite large in both absolute and relative terms.
Another way to look at the results presented in this paper is to consider the welfare gains from risk sharing. It is found that when monetary policy is coordinated the welfare level achieved in the risk-sharing case is unambiguously higher than the welfare level in the case where there is no …nancial market. But when monetary policy is not coordinated the answer is very di¤erent. In this case the gains from risk sharing are o¤set by the additional monetary policy spillover e¤ects generated by the existence of …nancial markets. These spillover e¤ects can be so strong that, for some parameter combinations, the risk-sharing case yields lower welfare than the case where there are no …nancial markets.
Introduction
What are the gains from international coordination of monetary policy? This is a long-standing question in international macroeconomics which was the subject of an extensive literature in the 1980's (see for instance Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) , Currie and Levine (1984) , Miller and Salmon (1984) , Oudiz and Sachs (1984) and Rogo¤ (1985) ). More recently attention has returned to the topic following the de- The assumption of …nancial autarky is to some extent less extreme than it may seem at …rst. It is a well-known result that when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is unity and utility is logarithmic in consumption, the trade balance is always in balance in any case. 2 The structure of international …nancial markets is therefore irrelevant. It is only in the cases where Obstfeld and Rogo¤ consider non-logarithmic utility that the structure of …nancial markets becomes relevant.
The structure of …nancial markets does however become much more important when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods di¤ers from unity. In this case the trade balance does not automatically balance in all states of the world so the structure of …nancial markets will have an important in ‡uence on 1 See for instance Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a) , Devereux and Engel (1998, 2000) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995 , 2002 . A recent survey of the literature is provided by Lane (2001) .
2 If all goods are traded then this result holds even when utility is not logarithmic in consumption.
the behaviour of the exchange rate and the consequential spillover e¤ects of monetary policy. Benigno and Benigno (2001a) analyse a model similar to the Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) model which allows for a non-unit elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods and which assumes a …nancial structure which permits full international consumption risk sharing. They show that the gains from coordination depend on the degree of elasticity of substitution, but in general Benigno and Benigno are not able to solve explicitly for welfare or quantify the gains from coordination.
A constraint that has hitherto hampered progress on this issue is the fact that it is not possible to obtain an explicit exact solution for welfare when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods di¤ers from unity. This paper adopts a second-order approximation technique to overcome this problem. Second-order accurate solutions for welfare are obtained for the general case where the elasticity of substitution di¤ers from unity. This allows explicit solutions for the coordinated and non-coordinated policy rules to be obtained and explicit expressions for the welfare yielded by coordinated and non-coordinated policy to be derived. It is therefore possible to trace the spillover e¤ects which give rise to gains from policy coordination and it is possible to quantify these gains.
In the …nancial autarky case it is found that a non-unit elasticity of substitution can indeed give rise to gains from coordination. But, as in the cases analysed by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) , these gains are quantitatively very small. The spillover e¤ects generated by the expenditure switching e¤ect therefore seem to be unimportant when …nancial markets do not exist. But in the risk-sharing case it is found that the gains from coordination can be much higher. The existence of …nancial markets creates additional spillover e¤ects which greatly increase the gains from policy coordination. Quantitatively these gains can be quite large in both absolute and relative terms.
Another way to look at the results presented in this paper is to consider the welfare gains from risk sharing. It is found that when monetary policy is coordinated the welfare level achieved in the risk-sharing case is unambiguously higher than the welfare level in the autarky case. But when monetary policy is not coordinated the answer is very di¤erent. In this case the gains from risk sharing are o¤set by the additional monetary policy spillover e¤ects generated by the existence of …nancial markets. These spillover e¤ects can be so strong that, for some parameter combinations, autarky yields higher welfare than risk sharing.
There have been a number of other contributions to the recent literature which are relevant to the subject of this paper. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) analyse the gains from monetary policy coordination when there is incomplete pass-through from exchange rate changes to local currency prices. They show that there are gains to coordination when there is incomplete pass-through even when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is unity. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) analyse the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy coordination in a model where there are non-optimal 'cost-push' shocks. Again they show that gains from coordination can arise even when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is The world exists for a single period 3 and consists of two countries, which will be referred to as the home country and the foreign country. Each country is populated by agents who consume a basket of goods containing all home and foreign produced goods. 4 Each agent is a monopoly producer of a single di¤erentiated product. There is a continuum of agents of unit mass in each country. Home agents are indexed h 2 [0; 1] and foreign agents are indexed f 2 [0; 1]. All agents set prices in advance of the realisation of shocks and are contracted to meet demand at the pre-…xed prices. 5 Prices are set in the currency of the producer.
The detailed structure of the home country is described below. The foreign country has an identical structure. Where appropriate, foreign real variables and foreign currency prices are indicated with an asterisk.
Preferences
All agents in the home economy have utility functions of the same form. The utility of agent z given by
3 The model can easily be recast as a multi-period structure but this adds no signi…cant insights.
A true dynamic model, with multi-period nominal contracts and asset stock dynamics would be considerably more complex and would require much more extensive use of numerical methods. Newly developed numerical techniques are available to solve such models and this is likely to be an interesting line of future research (see Kim and Kim (2000) , Sims (2000) , Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001) and Sutherland (2001) ). However, the approach adopted in this paper yields useful insights which would not be available in a more complex model. 4 In contrast to Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) all goods in this model are traded goods. The presence of non-traded goods (or equivalently home bias in consumption preferences) is important in generating welfare gains from coordination in the Obstfeld and Rogo¤ model. The model presented in this paper generates gains to coordination when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods di¤ers from unity. These gains exist even when there are no non-traded goods. 5 Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) interpret their model as one where households supply labour to …rms.
They assume that each household is a monopoly supplier of a particular variety of labour and that wages are sticky (while goods prices are perfectly ‡exible). This is purely a matter of description.
In terms of the analysis of this paper it makes no di¤erence if households are described as supplying labour or supplying goods. In the …rst case it would be appropriate to regard wages as the sticky nominal variable, while in the second case it would be appropriate to regard prices as the sticky nominal variable.
where ½ > 0; C is a consumption index de…ned across all home and foreign goods, M denotes end-of-period nominal money holdings, P is the consumer price index, y (z)
is the output of good z, E is the expectations operator, K is a log-normal stochastic labour-supply shock (E[log K] = 0 and V ar[log K] = ¾ 2 K ). The consumption index C for home agents is de…ned as
where µ¸1. C H and C F are indices of home and foreign produced goods de…ned as follows
where Á > 1; c H (h) is consumption of home good h and c F (f ) is consumption of foreign good f. The parameter µ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. This is the key parameter which will be the focus of the analysis in later sections. In Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) this parameter is …xed at unity.
The budget constraint of agent z is given by
where M 0 and M(z) are initial and …nal money holdings, T is lump-sum government transfers, p H (z) is the price of home good z; ® is a production subsidy and P is the aggregate consumer price index.
The government's budget constraint is
where P H is the aggregate price of home produced goods and Y is the aggregate output of the home economy, de…ned as follows
where C ¤ H is aggregate foreign demand for home goods.
Price Indices
The aggregate consumer price index for home agents is
where P H and P F are the price indices for home and foreign goods respectively de…ned as
The law of one price is assumed to hold. This implies p H (j) = p ¤ H (j) S and p F (j) = p ¤ F (j) S for all j where an asterisk indicates a price measured in foreign currency and S is the exchange rate (de…ned as the domestic price of foreign currency). Purchasing power parity holds in terms of aggregate consumer price indices, P = P ¤ S.
Consumption Choices
Individual home demand for representative home good, h, and foreign good, f, are
given by
where
Foreign demands for home and foreign goods have an identical structure to the home demands. Individual foreign demand for representative home good, h, and foreign good, f , are given by
Each country has a population of unit mass so the total demands for goods are equivalent to individual demands.
Optimal Price Setting
Individual agents are each monopoly producers of a single di¤erentiated good. They therefore set prices as a mark-up over marginal costs. The mark-up is given by Á=(Á ¡ 1): For convenience the mark-up is assumed to be o¤set by a production subsidy, ®; which is paid to all producers (…nanced out of lump-sum taxes). The subsidy is set such that Á= [(Á ¡ 1)(1 + ®)] = 1. This ensures that the expected level of output is at the socially optimal level (from the point of view of a world social planner).
The …rst-order condition for price setting is derived in the Appendix and implies the following
where Y is the total output of the home economy.
Notice that prices will contain a form of risk premium which will depend on the variances and covariances of the variables on the right hand side of (13) . The risk premium re ‡ects the fact that prices are set before shocks are realised. This risk premium plays a role in the link between shocks, monetary policy and welfare. An increase in the variance of KY for instance will (other things being equal) increase the risk premium and therefore increase the price of home produced goods. This lowers the expected level of output of home goods and therefore reduces the expected level of consumption for both home and foreign consumers. Home and foreign welfare is therefore reduced. Monetary policy can be used to a¤ect the variances and covariances which determine the risk premium and can therefore also a¤ect welfare. 6 
Home and Foreign Shocks
The foreign economy has a structure identical to the home economy. The foreign economy is subject to labour-supply shocks of the same form as the home economy.
For simplicity it is assumed that the variances of the shocks are identical across the two countries, i.e.
The cross-country coe¢cient of correlation of shocks is given by À where ¡1 · À · 1:
Money Demand and Supply
The …rst order condition for the choice of money holdings is
It is assumed that the monetary authority in each country chooses a rule for the setting of the money supply. These rules may depend on the realisations of the supply shocks in each country and will take the form
6 Note however that the risk premium is not the only link between monetary policy and welfare.
The feedback parameters ± K ; ± K ¤ ; ± ¤ K and ± ¤ K ¤ are chosen by policymakers before prices are set and shocks are realised. It is assumed that policymakers are able to pre-commit to their choice of rule. 7 
Financial Markets and Risk Sharing
When there are no …nancial markets the current account must balance in all states of the world, i.e.
where P H C ¤ H is the value of home sales to the foreign country valued in home currency and P F C F is the value of foreign sales to the home country valued in home currency.
In the risk sharing case it is assumed that su¢cient contingent …nancial instruments exist to allow e¢cient sharing of consumption risks. This implies the following
The fact that purchasing power parity also holds means that e¢cient risk sharing
It is important to specify the point in time at which agents are able to enter into risk-sharing contracts. There are two possible structures. In the …rst structure con- The distinction between the two risk-sharing structures is important from the point of view of policymakers. In the …rst structure policymakers are aware that agents are not fully insured against the potential negative impact of the choice of policy rule. Policymakers therefore internalise these costs. In the second case policymakers do not fully internalise the costs of policy rule choice. Not surprisingly 7 In the case of coordinated policy it is not necessary to assume pre-commitment because the expected level of output is assumed to be at the socially optimal level from the point of view of a world social planner. But in the case of non-coordinated policymaking there is an incentive for individual country policymakers to attempt to reduce output ex post in order to improve the terms of trade. In the absence of pre-commitment this creates a de ‡ationary bias in monetary policy. In this case no rational expectations equilibrium exists (as explained in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001b) ).
this can greatly increase the cross-country spillover e¤ects of monetary policymaking and can generate very large welfare gains from monetary policy coordination (as is shown in the Appendix). It is, however, questionable that the second risk-sharing structure is plausible. The choice of policy rules is not a stochastic event so it is not (strictly speaking) a source of risk. An insurance scheme which compensates consumers for the policy choices of their governments obviously creates a major moral hazard problem when governments act non-cooperatively.
Welfare
One of the main advantages of the model just described is that it provides a very natural and tractable measure of welfare which can be derived from the aggregate utility of agents. Following Rogo¤ (1998, 2002) it is assumed that the utility of real balances is small enough to be neglected. It is therefore possible to measure aggregate welfare of home agents using the following
It is not possible to derive an exact expression for welfare (except in special cases).
The complication arising in this model (which does not arise in other models used in recent literature) is contained in equations (6) and (7). When µ is greater than unity neither of these equations is linear in logs. The model is therefore solved as a second-order approximation around a non-stochastic steady state. This allows a second-order accurate solution for welfare to be derived.
De…ne the non-stochastic steady state of the model to be the solution which
where ¹ X is the value of variable X in the non-stochastic steady state. 8 A second-order approximation of the welfare measure is given bỹ
where is the deviation in the level of welfare from the non-stochastic steady state and the term O ³ k»k 3´c ontains all terms of third order and higher in deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. Notice that, to evaluate welfare, it is necessary to solve for both the …rst and second moments of output and consumption. The
Appendix describes some of the details of the solution process.
It is now possible analyse the welfare gains from policy coordination.
The Welfare Gains from Policy Coordination: The Logarithmic Utility Case
It is useful …rst to consider the case where utility is logarithmic in consumption. In this case the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion, ½; is set equal to unity.
Monetary Policy, the Exchange Rate and Output
Many of the implications of this model can be understood by examining the links between monetary policy in the two countries, the exchange rate and output. It is su¢cient for this purpose to consider a log-linearised version of the model. First note
where O ³ k»k 2´i s a residual which contains all terms of order two and above. Equation (21) implies that the deviation of goods prices from their non-stochastic steady state values is zero (to a …rst-order approximation) sô
When these expressions are combined with the demands for home and foreign goods it is simple to show that home and foreign aggregate outputs are given bŷ
Thus aggregate output is determined by aggregate world consumption and the exchange rate. The exchange rate term is the expenditure switching e¤ect. A depreciation of the exchange rate increases demand for home goods and reduces demand for foreign goods. Notice that the strength of the expenditure switching e¤ect is determined by µ (which is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods). These expressions hold regardless of the structure of …nancial markets.
Now consider the money market equations. When combined with the expressions for aggregate prices the money market equations implŷ
soĈ
Thus aggregate world consumption is determined by the sum of home and foreign monetary policy. Again this expression holds regardless of the structure of …nancial markets.
The structure of …nancial markets comes into play in the determination of the exchange rate. When there is no …nancial market the current account has to balance in all states of the world. Using the expressions for aggregate prices and the demands for home and foreign goods, current account balance implieŝ
Thus, when home consumption exceeds foreign consumption the exchange rate must depreciate in order to maintain current account balance (and vice versa when foreign consumption exceeds home consumption). When this expression is combined with the expressions for aggregate consumption it is found that
Thus the exchange rate depends on relative money supplies.
When there is risk sharing the risk-sharing condition implieŝ
When combined with the money market relationships this implieŝ
Thus again the exchange rate depends on relative monetary supplies. But notice that the exchange rate is more sensitive to monetary policy when there is risk sharing (provided µ > 1).
When the exchange rate expressions are combined with the expressions for aggregate consumption and outputs it is found that in the case of …nancial autarkŷ
while in the case of risk sharinĝ
The important point to note from these expressions is that in the …nancial autarky The expressions for output and the exchange rate just derived will prove useful for understanding the source of the gains from coordination. The returns to monetary coordination are now analysed in the …nancial autarky and risk-sharing cases.
Financial Autarky
The Appendix shows that in this case home and foreign welfare can be written as
and
while the previous section showed that output levels and the exchange rate are linked to monetary policy by the following simple relationshipŝ
To simplify notation the residual terms O ³ k»k 3´a nd O ³ k»k 2´h ave been omitted from these and all subsequent expressions. It should be understood, however, that the welfare expressions are second-order approximations and the output and exchange rate expressions are …rst-order approximations.
The structure of the welfare functions can easily be understood. Notice that welfare depends negatively on the variances ofŶ +K andŶ ¤ +K ¤ . These terms are e¤ectively the (log deviations of the) disutility of work e¤ort for home and foreign producers. A higher variance of the disutility of work e¤ort tends to raise the risk premium in goods prices. This reduces the expected level of output and consumption.
Agents consume both home and foreign goods so welfare in both countries depends on the variance of the disutility of work e¤ort in both countries. But notice that when µ > 1 the variance of home disutility matters more for home welfare than does the variance of foreign disutility (and vice versa for foreign welfare). This is because a rise in the variance of home disutility not only raises the price of home goods for home agents it also results in a switch in world expenditure towards foreign goods and this reduces the income of home agents. The same mechanism means that the variance of foreign disutility has a greater impact on foreign welfare than the variance of home disutility.
Welfare depends positively on the variance of the exchange rate (when µ > 1).
This can be understood by considering the de…nition of the consumer price index.
The consumer price index is concave in the price of home and foreign goods. Any volatility in the relative price of home and foreign goods (which would result from exchange rate volatility) will reduce the expected level of aggregate consumer prices.
This has a positive e¤ect on utility and welfare. (Another way to understand this e¤ect is to note that, when home and foreign goods are substitutable, agents can reduce the average cost of their consumption basket by switching expenditure towards whichever set of goods are cheapest ex post. Relative price volatility is therefore a utility bene…t.)
It is assumed that monetary authorities choose money supply rules of the following formM
In the case of coordinated policymaking it is assumed that a single world monetary authority chooses the feedback parameters of both rules to maximise world welfare, where world welfare is given by the average of national welfare levels, i.e.
In the case of non-coordinated policymaking it is assumed that the feedback para- The coordinated equilibrium results in the following choices of feedback parame-
where the superscript 'C' indicates the coordinated equilibrium. The non-coordinated equilibrium results in
where the superscript 'N' indicates the non-coordinated equilibrium. The world welfare level yielded by coordinated policy is
where again the superscript 'C' indicates the coordinated equilibrium and the subscript 'A' indicates the …nancial autarky case. The welfare yielded by non-coordinated policy is
As a point of reference it is useful to consider an inactive policy regime, where It is clear from expressions (33) to (36) that there will be gains to coordination provided µ > 1: When µ > 1 each monetary authority cares about the variance of the exchange rate, and monetary policy in each country a¤ects the exchange rate.
In addition, when µ > 1; each monetary authority cares more about the volatility of the disutility of work e¤ort in its own country than it does about the volatility of the disutility of work e¤ort in the other country. There is therefore a policy spillover (operating through the exchange rate) and an incentive to bias policy to the bene…t of domestic welfare.
The gains from coordination disappear in two circumstances. The …rst case is when µ = 1: In this case exchange rate volatility does not a¤ect welfare so there is no policy spillover. Each monetary authority therefore maximises the welfare of its population by minimising the variance of the disutility of work e¤ort in its own country. This also maximises world welfare. The second case where there are no gains from coordination is when the shocks in the two countries are perfectly correlated, i.e. when À = 1: This corresponds to a result noted and emphasised by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002) . When shocks are perfectly correlated the use of monetary policy to stabilise the disutility of work e¤ort in one country will automatically also stabilise disutility of work e¤ort in the other country. There is therefore no di¤erence between coordinated and non-coordinated policymaking. This proposition shows that non-coordinated policymaking is less active than coordinated policymaking. It also shows that the exchange rate and output levels are less volatile with non-coordinated policymaking. In other words non-coordinated policymaking has a bias towards over-stabilisation. At …rst sight it may seem strange that optimal coordinated policy should produce more volatility of output and the exchange rate (and by implication the terms of trade). But it should be born in mind that labour supply shocks imply that the socially optimal level of output is changing. The socially optimal monetary policy should allow these changes to occur.
Non-coordinated policymaking is preventing full adjustment of real quantities to the underlying socially optimal levels. 9 Proposition 1 establishes that there are gains to coordination when µ > 1: But in order to determine the size of these gains it is necessary to perform some numerical exercises with di¤erent values of µ: Table 1 reports some values for welfare with 
Risk Sharing
The procedure described in the Appendix can be used to show that home and foreign welfare in the risk-sharing case can be written as follows
while it was shown above that output levels and the exchange rate are linked to monetary policy by the following simple relationshipŝ
The form of the welfare function for each country is almost identical to the autarky case. The only di¤erence is a small change to the coe¢cient on the variance of the exchange rate. The main di¤erence between the this case and the previous case is contained in the determination of output. There is now a spillover e¤ect from monetary policy in one country to the level of output in the other country. It is clear that this creates more scope for gains from coordinated policy. The quantitative implications of this spillover e¤ect are considered below. First consider the expressions for feedback coe¢cients and welfare levels.
The coordinated equilibrium results in the following choices of feedback parame-
while the non-coordinated equilibrium results in
The world welfare level yielded by coordinated policy is
where the subscript 'R' indicates the risk sharing case. The welfare yielded by noncoordinated policy is
Again, as a point of reference it is useful to consider an inactive policy regime. The welfare level yielded by this regime is
A number of propositions can now be established (and again the proofs are omitted). is not true when the degree of risk aversion is di¤erent from unity. This case will be considered in the next section.)
In the autarky case it was clear that non-coordinated policy was less active than coordinated policymaking. In this case coordinated policymaking implies a stronger monetary policy reaction to shocks occurring within a country but a smaller reaction to shocks occurring in the other country. In other words non-coordinated policy involves a shifting of the burden of policy adjustment onto the other country. It remains true however that non-coordinated policy implies less volatility in the exchange rate and output levels.
The quantitative implications of risk sharing for the gains from coordination are illustrated in Table 2 . The parameter values are the same as those used to construct Table 1 and the structure of the table is identical. It is apparent that the gains from coordination are much larger than in the autarky case in both absolute and relative terms. For instance when µ = 6 the gains from coordination are worth 0.2 percent of steady state consumption which represents 12.3 percent of the gains from optimal stabilisation. These …gures obviously can not be described as large, but they are also not trivial. 10 1 0 Notice from (55), (56) and (57) that the size of the welfare e¤ects is proportional to the aggregate variance of the shocks. In a more general model, with more sources of shocks and some persistence in the shock processes, the size of the welfare e¤ects will depend on some aggregate of all shock variances and the degree of persistence of the shocks. This may generate larger welfare e¤ects than reported here. 
Financial Autarky
Using the procedure described in the Appendix it is possible to show that home and foreign welfare can now be written as follows
The output levels and the exchange rate are linked to monetary policy by the following simple relationshipŝ
It is also necessary to consider the relationship between monetary policy and consumption levels. These are as followŝ
It is apparent from (58) and (59) that the relationship between welfare and output and exchange rate volatility is rather more complicated than in the ½ = 1 case.
Equations (60) and (61) show that the relationship between output and the exchange rate and monetary policy is also more complicated than in the ½ = 1 case. It is now apparent from (60) and (61) that monetary policy can have a spillover e¤ect on output even when there is no risk sharing: Thus, when ½ > 1 an expansion of the home money supply will have a contractionary e¤ect on foreign output (and vice versa for an expansion of the foreign money supply). This spillover e¤ect creates a new possibility for welfare gains from policy coordination.
Another important new feature of the above relationships is that welfare now depends on the volatility of consumption. The reason for this is obvious. When utility is logarithmic in consumption agents do not care about the variance of the log-deviation of consumption. But when ½ > 1 risk aversion is su¢ciently strong to imply that volatility of the log-deviation of consumption has a negative e¤ect on aggregate utility (and vice versa for ½ < 1):
Equations (62) show how consumption depends on monetary policy. It is apparent that when ½ 6 = 1 and µ > 1 consumption in each country depends on monetary policy in each country. Thus, for instance, an increase in the home money supply raises both home and foreign consumption. This is because an increase in the home money supply raises output and income of home agents and this allows home agents to increase consumption of both home and foreign goods. This raises the income of foreign agents who are thus able also to raise consumption. Notice however that the increase in the home money supply has a larger e¤ect on home consumption than it does on foreign consumption.
This link between the money supply in one country and the level of consumption in the other country creates another a new spillover e¤ect of monetary policy. This again creates potential welfare gains from monetary policy coordination. Table 3 illustrates the quantitative implications of these new spillover e¤ects.
In this table µ = 2 and the value of ½ is varied between 1=4 and 8. 
1.589 0.227 0.571 4.167 9.276 12.00 13.64 Table 3 : The welfare e¤ects of coordination: Financial autarky absolute terms. Thus the new spillover e¤ects working via output and consumption are limited in magnitude when there is no risk sharing.
Risk sharing
Using the solution procedure described in the Appendix it is possible to show that home and foreign welfare in the risk-sharing case can be written as follows
where again ! = [1 + 2½ (µ ¡ 1)] : Output levels, the exchange rate and consumption are linked to monetary policy by the following simple relationshipŝ
It is again apparent that the main di¤erence between these relationships and their counterparts in the ½ = 1 case is the fact that welfare depends on the variance of consumption. This again creates a new spillover e¤ect. But notice now that consumption in each country depends equally on both home and foreign monetary policy. This is an obvious consequence of risk sharing. It is therefore possible that 
20.25 11.11 0.000 69.44 729.0 2156 4371 Table 5 : The welfare e¤ects of coordination: Symmetric shocks the spillover e¤ect operating through consumption levels is potentially more significant than in the autarky case (where home monetary policy had a greater e¤ect on home consumption and foreign monetary policy had a greater e¤ect on foreign consumption). Table 4 illustrates the quantitative implications for the gains to coordination. It is immediately apparent that the gains from coordination can now be quite large, both in absolute and relative terms, even for quite moderate values of µ and ½: For instance when ½ = 4 the gains from coordination are approaching 0.5 percent of steady state consumption which represents over 80 percent of the gains from optimal stabilisation policy.
Symmetric Shocks and the Gains from Policy Coordination
In Section 4 is was shown that with ½ = 1 there were no welfare gains to policy coordination when the shocks in the two countries are perfectly correlated. This continues to be true in the autarky case when ½ 6 = 1. But it is not true on the risk-sharing case when ½ 6 = 1: Table 5 
The Welfare Gains from Risk Sharing
The analysis so far has concentrated on the welfare gains from policy coordination.
But the model also yields estimates of the welfare gains from risk sharing. Table 6 repeats some of numerical welfare results from the previous sections in a way which allows a comparison across …nancial market structures. Table 6 The …gures in the …rst row in Table 6 provide a quantitative measure of the potential welfare gain from risk sharing. These …gures are within the range of estimates suggested by previous literature. 12 The welfare e¤ects of risk sharing are somewhat smaller when monetary policy is not coordinated. A comparison of (45) and (56) shows that risk sharing again provides an unambiguous welfare gain when ½ = 1. But …gures in the second row of Table 6 show that the welfare gain is smaller than when monetary policy is coordinated. The monetary policy spillover e¤ects created by risk sharing partly o¤set the welfare gains of risk sharing when monetary policy is uncoordinated.
The welfare gains from risk sharing are, however, very sensitive to the degree of risk aversion. This is illustrated in Table 7 . This table again reports values for the welfare gain from risk sharing for the cases of coordinated and non-coordinated monetary policy. In this case µ is set equal to 2 and ½ is varied. It is again clear that the welfare e¤ect of risk sharing is positive when monetary policy is coordinated.
But it is also now apparent that the welfare e¤ect can be negative when monetary Table 7 suggest that this can occur for quite moderate values of ½ and µ: The model assumes that all prices are …xed in advance so it is not possible directly to analyse a price targeting policy. But it is possible to gain some indirect insight into the implications for prices by considering the …rst-order condition for price setting that would be relevant if agents were able to set prices after shocks are realised. The …rst-order condition for the choice of prices in a ‡exible-price equilibrium is derived in the Appendix and implies the followinĝ 
Conclusion
This paper has analysed the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy coordination in a model where the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods can di¤er from unity. It is shown that welfare gains to policy coordination can arise when the elasticity is greater than unity, but these gains are quantitatively small when there is no international …nancial market. When, however, there is a su¢ciently sophisticated …nancial market to allow full consumption risk sharing the gains from policy coordination are found to be much larger. This is particularly true when the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion di¤ers from unity. bonds. This type of model will inevitably involve asset stock dynamics and will therefore require more extensive use of numerical simulation techniques. 13 An alternative way to model an intermediate degree of risk sharing has recently been proposed by Worrall (1997, 2000) and Kehoe and Perri (2000) . It may also be interesting to consider the gains from monetary policy coordination in this alternative 'endogenous incomplete market' framework. 
Appendix Optimal Price Setting
The price-setting problem facing a …xed-price producer is the following:
subject to
The …rst order condition with respect to p H (z) is
In equilibrium all agents choose the same price and consumption level so
Rearranging yields the expression in the main text.
The price-setting problem facing a ‡exible-price producer is the following:
Model Solution
The solution procedure is described using the autarky case as an illustration. The amendments necessary to derive the risk sharing solution are then described.
In order to derive a solution for the welfare measure it is necessary to derive The log-deviation form of the money market equations implieŝ
For home and foreign demand equations the log-deviation forms arê
The log-deviation form of current account balance implieŝ
And the log-deviation form of purchasing power parity implieŝ
None of the above equations require any approximation when converting to logdeviation form.
The expressions for total outputs, aggregate prices and price setting do require approximation. The second-order approximation for the total output equations arê
The second-order approximations for the aggregate price indices arê
And the second-order approximations for the price setting conditions arê 
91)
Notice now that welfare can be written entirely in terms of second moments. The remaining task is therefore to derive expressions for the second moments of the variables of the model. This task is made easier by noting that second-order accurate solutions for second moments can be derived from …rst-order accurate solutions for the realisations of variables. First-order accurate solutions for ex post realisations can be obtained from equations (82) 
95)
Home welfare can therefore be written as follows
which is the expression used in the main text. The expression for foreign welfare follows immediately by symmetry.
The procedure for deriving welfare expressions for the risk-sharing case is iden- the case considered immediately below in this Appendix) the risk sharing condition is imposed for the derivation of both …rst and second moment terms.
An Alternative Risk Sharing Structure
This appendix brie ‡y considers the case where risk sharing takes place before monetary policy rules are determined. Only the case where ½ = 1 is considered. In this case the solution procedure described above can be used to show that home and foreign welfare can be written as follows
while output levels and the exchange rate are given by (49) and (50) in the main text.
Equations (97) and (98) show that the change in the timing of risk trading has a signi…cant e¤ect on the structure of the welfare function. It is still the case that welfare depends on the volatility of the disutility of work e¤ort in both countries and the volatility of the exchange rate. But now there is a much stronger imbalance between the e¤ects of the volatility of work e¤ort at home and abroad. Consider the home country welfare function. For values of µ greater than 2 home welfare is increasing in the volatility of the disutility of home work e¤ort and decreasing in the volatility of the disutility of foreign work e¤ort. This is as a direct result of the change in timing of risk trading. The home policymaker now knows that home agents are 'insured' against any change in the expected level of their work e¤ort.
If the home policymaker chooses a monetary rule which increases the volatility of The quantitative implications of the additional spillover e¤ects arising in this case are illustrated in Table 8 . The parameter values and construction of the table are identical to the cases discussed in the main text. It is clear that the gains from coordination can now be very large, both in relative and absolute terms. When compared to the case where risk trading takes place after policy rules are chosen non-coordinated policymaking now yields much lower levels of welfare.
